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Jacques Lacan and Language 
 
John Shannon Hendrix 
 
 
According to Jacques Marie Emile Lacan in Écrits, the metonymic chain in 
language produces signification at a point which is the “anchoring point,” the 
point de capiton or button hole, which occurs retroactively, after the phrase 
is completed, and is the point at which the network of signifiers in the meto-
nymic chain corresponds to a network of signifiers in the concept, the idea of 
mouth or river, for example, and thus accomplishes signification. The meto-
nymic chain accomplishes this without “crossing the bar” into meaning, or 
the signified; the idea of mouth or river is not present in the metonym itself. 
When I speak I can only communicate something to you at the point at which 
what I say matches what you anticipate what I will say, thus communication 
occurs retroactively. The anchoring point is the point at which meaning or an 
idea is produced in the glissement, the sliding of the signifiers (p. 303),1 but 
it is also the point at which absence is made present in signification, the ab-
sent subject which is seen as a signifier representing itself to other signifiers. 
When the functioning of the linguistic structure allows me to communicate 
an idea, it is the linguistic structure, the symbolic order, the Other or the un-
conscious, which allows me to communicate the idea, and my presence or 
existence as a speaking subject is negated. It is a trace or gap in language; 
my absence in language reveals the presence of the unconscious in absence, 
the presence of the Other into which I am inserted in the symbolic order. My 
imaginary ego in conscious thought, my identification with my image and 
images in general, prevents me from seeing myself as an absence in lan-
guage, prevents me from experiencing my unconscious.        
      This type of production in language was labelled by Lacan “signifiance,” 
as opposed to significance or signifying, a type of production in language 
which does not cross the bar, the point of resistance, between the signifier 
and the signified in language, from the Saussurean model. Signifiance con-
tains the presence of the irrational and the unconscious, and the absence of 
the signified, and thus the absence of the subject, and the absence of being, 
though it is predicated on the presence of that absence. As the concept of the 
metonym in language corresponds to the process of displacement (Verschie-
bung) in Freudian dream work, in the relation between dream thoughts and 
dream images, the dialectic of the rational and irrational corresponds to the 
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dialectic of conscious and unconscious thought. The unconscious should not 
be correlated with the irrational though; the irrationality of dreams is a prod-
uct of the reading of dreams in conscious thought, not of the unconscious 
processes which produce them. The presence of the irrational in the rational 
contributes to the Lacanian concept of the unconscious, as a gap in rational 
thought, and the unconscious is structured like a language; it is through this 
concept that psychoanalysis, or the philosophy of the structure of the psyche, 
or the philosophy of the identity of the human subject, and in particular its 
identity in language and perception, and the study of the mechanisms of con-
scious and unconscious thought, correspond. Lacanian psychoanalysis can be 
seen as a philosophy of intellect, and a structural one at that. 
      Unconscious thought is seen as a different form of thought than con-
scious thought, and exhibits aspects of the irrational in relation to the ration-
al. The linguistic structure of the dream image of Sigmund Freud is seen as 
diffuse, clumsy and awkward; it is missing the organization of conscious rea-
son, while its forms are mimetic of it. If the unconscious is the discourse of 
the Other, in Lacanian terms, if the unconscious is the network of language 
and rules into which the subject is inserted, it is only so in so far as it is a 
mimesis of the discourse of the Other. Dream images, the manifest content of 
the dream, are not capable of representing logical relations between the 
dream thoughts, the latent content of the dream, according to Freud in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, or of representing logical relations between con-
scious thoughts, the relations created by syntactical rules.  
      Dream images can be characterized by their incapacity to incorporate to 
any significant degree the syntactical structures of language. The syntactical 
structures of language interweave the imaginary and the symbolic, conscious 
and unconscious, in the complete constitution of the subject. The imaginary 
corresponds to the perception of the image, the Vorstellung in reproductive 
imagination as it is connected to the perception of the sensible form, and the 
mnemic residue of the image which is incorporated in dreams. The symbolic 
corresponds to language, the logos endiathetos and the intelligible, and the 
intelligible form as symbol, in the signifying structure into which the per-
ceiving subject is incorporated. In Freudian dream analysis, dreams remain a 
function of the imaginary rather than the symbolic, though the composition 
of the dream is determined by linguistic structures, the symbolic, which are 
the structure of the unconscious. 
      Linguistic structures which can be found in dream composition include 
metaphor and metonymy, which, as Lacan demonstrates, reveal the uncon-
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scious in conscious discourse, as well as syntactical mechanisms such as el-
lipsis, pleonasm, hyperbaton, syllepsis, apposition, catachresis, and antono-
masis, which are the mechanisms of condensation and displacement, 
regression and repetition, which contribute to the composition of dream im-
ages as elements of the unconscious registered in the subject by the Other of 
Lacan, the linguistic superstructure which determines the subject in ways that 
are not always conscious, corresponding to the intellectual, a priori intuition, 
and the universal of Hegel. In that these are the mechanisms which allow the 
subject to moderate the dream discourse, they are not mechanisms of the 
dream itself, but rather the conscious reading of the dream in discursive rea-
son; the unconscious can only be found in conscious thought, as an absence, 
and the irrational can only be found in rational thought, as that which is other 
to it within itself. Intellection can only be made present to consciousness in 
discursive reason, which limits access to it, given its corruption in relation to 
sense perception. 
      Among the syntactical mechanisms, ellipsis involves the omission of a 
word in a syntax without altering the signification, introducing a gap in the 
syntactical structure. A pleonasm is the use of more words than are necessary 
for the signification, so it is a repetition, and a condensation. A syllepsis is 
the use of a word in a syntax which agrees with one word in the syntax 
grammatically but not another, so it is a displacement, suggesting the irra-
tional within the rational. An apposition is the placing of a word in a sen-
tence to explain another word, as a repetition. A catachresis is the incorrect 
use of a word; an autonomasis is the use of a title instead of a name. These 
are the primary condensations and displacements, along with metaphor and 
metonymy, which are active in both language and dream construction.  
      The syllepsis can act as the point de capiton, the anchoring point of La-
can in the signifying chain. The anchoring point of Lacan is the point at 
which, in the retroactive anticipation of meaning on the part of the subject in 
the course of the diachronic establishment of a syntactical structure, a sen-
tence for example, the subject enters into the structure in the gap between 
signifiers, linguistic units, and is represented by one signifier to the next sig-
nifier, either diachronically or retroactively, and the subject becomes aware 
that there is a disjunction between the signifier in language and itself, a bar 
which cannot be crossed, because the structure of the signification, the dis-
course of the Other, is the unconscious, which is not accessible by conscious 
thought. The unconscious is inaccessible as the intellectual is not fully acces-
sible to discursive reason, except by representation. The intellectual in phi-
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losophy is partly knowable through rigorous intellection, while the uncon-
scious is partly knowable through the practice of psychoanalysis. 
      The coexistence of the mnemic image and the phonetic element or signi-
fier in the writing of a dream is the coexistence of the imaginary and symbol-
ic, and the coexistence of the mnemic residue of the visual perception and 
the mnemic residue of the auditory perception, the traces interwoven into the 
language of the unconscious. The visual residue is the “thing presentation” 
(Sachvorstellung), according to Freud, and the auditory residue is the “word 
presentation” (Wortvorstellung) in the formation of the dream image, which 
is described by Freud as the transition from the latent content to the visual 
image of the dream in a “concern for representability” (Rücksicht auf Dar-
stellbarkeit). The coexistence of the Sachvorstellung and the Wortvorstellung 
in the Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit, in the writing of the dream, is a “double 
inscription” (Niederschrift) which involves condensation and displacement, 
repression and repetition, and which corresponds to the coexistence of con-
scious and repressed or unconscious images which may occur in the precon-
scious, in the memory of the dream, and which constitutes the structure of 
conscious language in the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy in partic-
ular. Dream work functions as a productive imagination, combining intelligi-
ble forms with menemic residues of sensible forms. 
      The Niederschrift contributes to the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz of the 
dream, which is the representation of a representation, according to Freud, 
but which, according to Lacan, is that which takes the place of the represen-
tation. The intelligible form takes the place of the sensible form. The mnemic 
residue of an image in perception is transformed by syntactical mechanisms 
in the unconscious as it is seen as a hallucination or the mnemic residue of 
the dream. The Vorstellungsrepräsentanz poses a disjunction between what 
is perceived by the subject and what is represented in the mind, as perceived 
reality is given by mind, and language structures perception. The disjunction 
between what is seen and what is represented to mind is the disjunction be-
tween sense perception and intellection in philosophical metaphysics, be-
tween the real and the ideal, in the terms of Hegel, or between the form and 
the idea in the terms of Plato. The disjunction of the metaphysic is displaced, 
in linguistics and psychoanalysis, from the structure of reason in conscious-
ness to the structure of language and the unconscious, as seen in the Vorstel-
lungsrepräsentanz. The disjunction between what is seen and what is 
represented reveals a divided subject, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, a subject 
which does not know itself, and a subject which is alienated from its con-
Jacques Lacan                                                                                                5 
 
scious reason, in the tradition of Hegel, for whom reason becomes alienated 
from itself in its doubling. The basis of Lacanian psychoanalysis is to be 
found in linguistics, and in the study of language and perception.  
      As a result of the complex network of psychical relationships which pro-
duce the dream images, and the mechanisms of condensation and displace-
ment, dreams are composed of disconnected fragments of visual images, 
syntactical structure in language, and thoughts consisting of intelligibles and 
perceptions. These comprise the Sachvorstellung and the Wortvorstellung, 
the thing presentation and the word presentation, the sensible image and the 
intelligible image, which are seen in a variety of logical relations to each 
other in a palimpsest of traces which is difficult to unravel, and which can 
appear to be irrational, according to Freud. The network of logical relations 
which contribute to the composition of dream images is too complex to be 
unraveled in dream analysis. Displacement, condensation, fragmentation, 
substitution and the coincidentia oppositorum, coincidence of opposites, are 
products of the complex network of logical relations, or the mnemic residues 
of such, in the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz in dream thoughts, which is too 
complex to correspond to any logical structure, just as intellection is not 
completely accessible to discursive reason in metaphysics. In the process of 
the dream formation, the logical links which hold the psychical material to-
gether are lost. It is the task of analysis to restore the logical connections 
which the dream work has destroyed, as dreams are seen as the royal road to 
a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind, as Freud writes in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, an access to psychical mechanisms which psycho-
analysis seeks to understand. Lacanian psychoanalysis furthers this quest in 
the analysis of the linguistic mechanisms of which dreams are a product. 
      The relation between the dream image and the dream thought, the mani-
fest content and latent content, can be seen in the relation of the subject to 
language. The dream image responds to the dream thought in the Vorstel-
lungsrepräsentanz, as a form of psychical activity in response to perceptual 
activity. The content of the perception is anticipated and rearranged, as the 
subject is anticipated in language, retroactively, in the same way that the 
content of perception is ordered by the intellectual or intuition. In the uncon-
scious, as in intellection, the word represents the image to another word as 
the signifier represents the subject to another signifier, and it is that series of 
relations which make both the dream and language possible and intelligible.  
      Lacan compared the distortion (Enstellung) described by Freud in dream 
work (Traumarbeit), to glissement in signification, the sliding of the signi-
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fied under the signifier in the course of the signifying chain, as seen especial-
ly in metaphor, where one word takes the place of another, which bars the 
subject from signification, from the language which it produces in conscious 
thought. In the gap between what is perceived and what is represented in the 
dream as the mnemic residue of perception, a direct connection is lost in the 
process of distortion, as the connection is lost between the signifier and the 
signified in language. Freud’s dream condensation (Verdichtung) is com-
pared by Lacan to the combination of signifiers in metaphor. Displacement 
(Verschiebung) is compared to the transfer of signification in metonymy, 
where the correspondence between signifier and signified is maintained, but 
shifted, and rendered nonsensical. 
      The only difference between the mechanisms in language and the mech-
anisms in the dream work, according to Freud, is the difference between the 
intentions of communication in language and the consideration of represent-
ability (Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit) in the dream, which is also a mecha-
nism of a type of communication, which combines both Wortvorstellung and  
Sachvorstellung in conscious discourse. The elision of the subject in lan-
guage, in the dream and conscious discourse, creates an absence of the sub-
ject to itself in its reason, as in the doubling of reason of Hegel. The 
anticipation of the subject in the signifying chain caused by the absence of 
the subject, which occurs at the point de capiton, or the inaccessibility of the 
unconscious, is that which causes desire in the subject in signification. The 
desire of the subject is the desire of the Other, for Lacan, the discourse of 
which the unconscious is composed. Desire is enacted by the objet a of La-
can, that which is missing from the subject, and in perception the objet a is 
found in the gaze, that which is missing from perception. 
      In Chomskian linguistics, the surface aspect of a language is the phonetic 
form or physical signal, the signifying element of the word as sign, as it 
were, in Saussurean linguistics, while the deep aspect is a “corresponding 
mental analysis,”2 as described in Language and Mind by Noam Chomsky, 
that arises in response to the physical signal of the phonetic form. In 
Chomskian linguistics, the sign only contains a signifier and not a signified, 
as it would in Saussurean linguistics, because, first, the corresponding mental 
analysis consists only in sets of extended signifiers prompted by the phonetic 
signal, and second, because the phonetic signal only operates in a given syn-
tax, and not of its own. For Chomsky the deep aspect of language consists of 
interrelating propositions and complex ideas, networks of signifiers, that are 
not articulated in the phonetic signal but are generated by it, and are generat-
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ed by a matrix of underlying relations from the signal. The deep aspect con-
sists of a network of formal regularities organized by a conceptual frame-
work, which might be described as the unconscious. According to Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz in the Monadology, perception is a multiplicity of sensa-
tions which involves the self-consciousness or awareness the sensations, 
leading to the possibility of the unconscious. The self-consciousness of the 
sensations is “apperception.” The differential mechanism of perception is 
analogous to the mechanism of sensual bodies in flux. As Anna Teresa Ty-
mieniecka put it, “for Leibniz the continuity of the psychological flux is 
grounded in the continuity of stages of incessantly varying and passing in-
sensible perceptions understood as the basic element or material of the con-
scious flux.”3 Such would constitute a “deep aspect” of perception, a 
network of perceptions, intelligible and sensible, connected to an isolated 
perception of a form, in the same way that a network of signifiers is generat-
ed from a signifier in language. The structure of perception must be related 
to the structure of language, in that perception is constructed by reason, 
which is borne out in the theories of Jacques Lacan. Apperception can also 
be called “macroperception,” and as Gilles Deleuze explained, “macroper-
ception is the product of differential relations that are established among mi-
croperceptions.”4 The continuity of the stages of insensible perceptions, and 
the differential relations among microperceptions, constitute desire in per-
ception, generated by language, and the intersection between language and 
perception.       
      The network of signifiers generated by the form in the deep aspect must 
be differentiated from the formal syntax itself, and this is found in the dialec-
tic between perception and the forms perceived. This is accomplished by 
formulating “a base system of rules which are concerned with underlying re-
lations” (Language and Mind, p. 16), in the words of Chomsky. In other 
words, the abstract level of the network of perceptions, the intelligible forms, 
as opposed to the physical level, the sensible forms, requires an abstract con-
ceptual structure of universal principles, as for Kant and Hegel, in the deep 
structure of language in Chomskian linguistics, in which apperception can be 
framed. This requires the movement from the particular to the universal in 
thought, as in Hegel; inversely, the surface aspect of apperception, the per-
ception of physical relations, can only be understood within the conceptual 
framework of the deep aspect. In other words, a pure sensual perception of 
physical relations is impossible, the unmediated perception of phenomenolo-
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gy; a conceptual structure is always already present in the perception of the 
sensual world; the intelligible form precedes the sensible form. 
      In linguistics, ambiguity arises from the “logical conflict of the denota-
tive and the connotative,”5 as described by William Empson in Seven Types 
of Ambiguity, the denotative being the signifier in the phonetic signal, and 
the connotative being the network of signifiers generated by it. Noam Chom-
sky gave as an example of such ambiguity the phrase “the shooting of the 
hunters”: each signifier in the signals corresponds to a particular network of 
signifiers (the signified), but because of the position of each signifier in the 
syntax of the phrase, there are multiple possibilities of combinations of net-
works of signifiers to be drawn from the phrase, in its connotative effect; be-
cause of the position of the gerund in relation to the noun, the noun can be 
either the subject or the object of the phrase, and the designation of the prep-
osition is undefined. Such ambiguity in language serves as a transformational 
device, because in reading the phrase the perceiver becomes aware of the un-
derlying conceptual, abstract matrix which necessitates the perception of the 
phrase, in other words, the work of the intellectual or the unconscious. Rea-
son thus becomes conscious of itself in language, and self-conscious of its 
own process in perception. Such ambiguity renders the phrase functionally 
meaningless, and exhibits the limitations of language as representation in re-
lation to both perception and meaning, and the limitations of discursive rea-
son in relation to perception.       
      Ferdinand de Saussure, in the Course in General Linguistics, compared 
the relationship between the signifier and the signified in language to a sheet 
of paper: “Language can also be compared with a sheet of paper: thought 
[signified] is the front and the sound [signifier] the back; one cannot cut the 
front without cutting the back at the same time; likewise in language, one can 
neither divide sound from thought nor thought from sound; the division 
could be accomplished only abstractly, and the result would be either pure 
psychology or pure phonology” (p. 113).6 The signified is conceived as be-
ing the same substance as the signifier. But this is impossible, if the signifier 
is a physical, phonetic entity and the signified is an abstract, conceptual enti-
ty, an intelligible, though it is based on the mimesis of the signifier. Saussure 
himself renders the possibility of an identification in substance between 
sound and thought invalid in the following sentence in the Course in General 
Linguistics: “Linguistics then works in the borderland where the elements of 
thought and sound combine; their combination produces a form, not a sub-
stance.” An identification between thought and sound, signified and signifier, 
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can only be a formal identification, an identification of representation, and 
one which is easily negated, in order to free the syntax of signifiers in a 
composition in language, or in visual forms, so that it can create its own sig-
nification. 
      The possible disjunction between the signifier and signified was affirmed 
by Saussure himself in the analogy of language to layers of planes or waves: 
“Against the floating realm of thought, would sounds by themselves yield 
pre-delimited entities? No more so than ideas. Phonic substance is neither 
more fixed nor more rigid than thought; it is not a mold into which thought 
must of necessity fit but a plastic substance divided in turn into distinct parts 
to furnish the signifiers needed by thought” (p. 112). Thus the “linguistic fact 
can therefore be pictured in its totality—i.e. language—as a series of contig-
uous subdivisions marked off on both the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas 
and the equally vague plane of sounds.” Language does not “create a materi-
al phonic means for expressing ideas,” as the analogy of the piece of paper 
would suggest, but it rather serves “as a link between thought and sound, un-
der conditions that of necessity bring about the reciprocal delimitations of 
units.” In other words, language creates the disjunction between signifier and 
signified in structural linguistics, but still connects the concept and the per-
ception, the intelligible and sensible. 
      For Saussure, the phonic substance of language in the vague plane of 
sounds is irreducibly disjoined from the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas in 
thought, the intelligibles, which must be seen not as a network of signifieds, 
but as a network of signifiers themselves, which, though “chaotic by na-
ture….shapeless and confused,” as revealed in dreams, are ordered in the 
process of language, in the interaction with the network of signifiers in 
speech, writing, and composition, the logos prophorikos; thus, “language 
works out its units while taking shape between two shapeless masses,” be-
tween which there is a unbridgeable gap. In the ordering of language, the 
formation of the sign, the “thought-sound” in the pairing of the signified and 
signifier, or the insertion of one phonetic signifier into a network of abstract 
signifiers, is completely arbitrary according to its own mechanisms, accord-
ing to Saussure. “Not only are the two domains that are linked by the linguis-
tic fact shapeless and confused, but the choice of a given slice of sound to 
name a given idea [network of abstract signifiers] is completely arbitrary” 
(Course in General Linguistics, p. 113). The only determinate factor in the 
pairing of the phonetic signifier with the idea or concept is a culturally de-
termined syntax, which might be characterized as Chomsky’s “system of 
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rules that characterize deep and surface structures and the transformational 
relation between them.” Thus for Saussure, “the social fact alone can create a 
linguistic system.” This would be a basis for the Lacanian Other. 
      Language cannot thus depend on a direct relationship between a signifier 
and signified, between a word or form and an idea, in order to generate signi-
fication. In Saussure’s analogy, a network of signifiers interacts on a phonet-
ic level, while at the same time a network of signifiers interacts on an 
abstract level, and it is at the points of intersection between these two matri-
ces that language is produced. Since the interactions between the signifiers 
on the phonetic, physical level are independent of any attached abstract sig-
nifiers, the interactions can only be characterized as “differences” in opposi-
tion, and not only that, but “differences without positive terms” (p. 120). Not 
only is language at the phonetic level, that is, speech, surface structure or 
logos prophorikos, characterized as a play of differences without positive 
terms, but the conceptual level of language, the deep structure or logos en-
diathetos, is also characterized as a play of differences without positive 
terms. “A linguistic system is a series of differences of sound combined with 
a series of differences of ideas…” according to Saussure. This reaffirms the 
necessity that the signified be seen as a network of abstract signifiers. The 
movement between the series of differences of sound and ideas is defined by 
Saussure as “shifting,” and it is this shifting which determines the production 
of significance in language. “Regardless of what the forces of change are, 
whether in isolation or in combination, they always result in a shift in the re-
lationship between the signified,” or network of signifiers, “and the signifi-
er.…Language is radically powerless to defend itself against the forces 
which from one current to the next are shifting the relationship between the 
signified and the signifier. This is one of the consequences of the arbitrary 
nature of the sign” (pp. 74–75). 
      Jacques Derrida referred to this “systematic production of differences” 
introduced by Saussure as différance, which is based on the interdependence 
of the network of signifiers (speech events, parole, logos prophorikos), and 
the network of signifieds (the linguistic system, la langue, language without 
speech, logos endiathetos, to be redefined by both Derrida and Lacan as a 
network of abstract signifiers). According to Saussure, the “linguistic system 
(la langue) is necessary for speech events (parole) to be intelligible and pro-
duce their effects, but the latter are necessary for the system to establish it-
self.”7 Because of this self-referential interdependence of la langue and 
parole, language is seen as the production of a system of differences, diffé-
Jacques Lacan                                                                                                11 
 
rance. Derrida’s neologism refers to both the act of differing and the act of 
deferring, as the production of differences is seen as deferring a possible re-
lation between a signifier and what might be a signified. Différance is related 
to the term espacement, or “spacing,” and can also be related to the Saussur-
ean term “shifting.” In Positions, Derrida described différance as “a structure 
and a movement that cannot be conceived on the opposition pres-
ence/absence [signifier/signified]. Différance is the systematic play of differ-
ences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by which elements relate to one 
another.”8 The spacing is thus the “production, simultaneously active and 
passive…of intervals without which the ‘full’ terms could not signify, could 
not function.” Différance is the mechanism of the production of differences 
in signification in the absence of a direct relationship between signifier and 
signified, in the linguistic structure introduced by Saussure. 
      Further, according to Derrida, “the play of differences [différance] in-
volves syntheses and referrals that prevent there from being at any moment 
or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself and refers only 
to itself. Whether in written or in spoken discourse, no element can function 
as a sign [signifier] without relating to another element which itself is not 
simply present” (Positions p. 26). This relation “means that each ‘element’—
phoneme or grapheme—is constituted with reference to the trace in it of the 
other elements of the sequence or system. This linkage, this weaving, is the 
text, which is produced only through the transformation of another text. 
Nothing, either in the elements or in the system, is anywhere simply present 
or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces,” as in 
the traces of menemic residues of Freud.  
      In the thought of Lacan, the absent signifier is the key to understanding 
both metaphor and metonym, the principal mechanisms of signification in 
différance. The “instituted trace” of Derrida can be related to the bar of signi-
fication of Lacan, as the archê or chôra of différance in signification, the 
point at which the mechanism of differentiation is no longer reducible, and 
which constitutes a displacement of the role of the chôra in classical philos-
ophy in modern linguistics. The impossibility of there “being at any moment 
or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself” is present in 
Zeno’s paradox. In the flight of an arrow, the arrow is always in a particular 
location an any given instant, and thus must never be in motion. The arrow 
can only be in motion if each particular instant is seen in relation to preced-
ing and succeeding instants, and contains the traces of those instants, as a 
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signifier in language would contain the traces of all preceding and succeed-
ing signifiers in a sentence. 
      Derrida identified the maintaining by Saussure of an instituted relation-
ship between the signifier and the “signified” a form of “logocentrism,” a 
kind of metaphysic in the distinction between the sensible and the intelligi-
ble, between the phonetic phenomenon in speech and the idea or concept. In 
metaphysics the signifier is subordinated to the signified and it is the idea or 
concept which is primary. The metaphysical is located in the “transcendental 
signified,” the possibility of the idea or concept which exceeds language, as 
in nous, and the possibility of an intellect which exceeds reason and logic. In 
Positions, “maintenance of the rigorous [on the part of Saussure] distinc-
tion—an essential and juridical distinction—between the signans and the 
signatum and the equation between signatum and the concept leaves open in 
principle the possibility of conceiving of a signified concept in itself, a con-
cept simply present to thought, independent from the linguistic system, that 
is to say from a system of signifiers” (p. 19).  
      Saussure made it clear that any possibility of a “transcendental signified” 
can only be found in the abstract concept itself, the intelligible, as representa-
tion, as “in language, one can neither divide sound from thought nor thought 
from sound; the division could be accomplished only abstractly, and the re-
sult would be either pure psychology or pure phonology.” Such is the first 
principle of metaphysics, that the signatum cannot be independent of the 
signans by which it is constituted. Derrida continued, “in leaving this possi-
bility open, and it is so left by the very principle of the opposition between 
signifier and signified and thus of the sign, Saussure contradicted the critical 
acquisition of which we have spoken,” and by doing so he “accedes to the 
traditional demand for what I have proposed to call a ‘transcendental signi-
fied,’ which in itself or in its essence would not refer to any signifier, which 
would transcend the chain of signs and at a certain moment would no longer 
itself function as a signifier.” But there is no transcendental signified in met-
aphysics that is not connected to a signifier. 
      Here Derrida re-interpreted Saussure’s “identification” between signifier 
and signified as “opposition,” and at the same time defines the signified as 
the signifier itself. Neither of these concepts can be found in Saussure him-
self. Derrida thus concluded, “On the contrary, though, from the moment one 
puts in question the possibility of such a transcendental signified and recog-
nizes that every signified is also in the position of a signifier, the distinction 
between signifier and signified and thus the notion of the sign becomes prob-
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lematic at its root.” But there is no necessity for such a transcendental signi-
fied. The same conclusion can be drawn from the identification which Saus-
sure himself makes between signifier and signified. For Derrida, this “does 
not mean that the notion of sign could or should be scrapped; on the contrary, 
the distinction between what signifies and what is signified is essential to any 
thought whatever.”  
      This distinction arises within the trace, within différance, rather than as 
an a priori condition, and the metaphysic is preserved as such. As Eric Perl 
wrote, “whenever a supposed ‘transcendental signified’ is produced, it turns 
out, necessarily, to be defined and constituted by difference, and therefore 
produced within the system, the text, to which it is supposedly prior and in-
dependent.”9 Derrida, in fact, maintained the priority of the signified over the 
signifier, as the substance of the production of language, given that the signi-
fied is none other than a network of signifiers. In Of Grammatology, the 
“signifier will never by rights precede the signified, in which case it would 
no longer be a signifier and the ‘signifying’ signifier would no longer have a 
possible signified.”10 It will be left to Jacques Lacan to challenge this rela-
tionship, the priority of the signified. In the shifting of Saussure, the dual 
play of differentiation between the abstract and the physical, it is at those 
points of the interaction between like signifiers, and in their combination, 
where a “positive fact” or “value” is produced in language. If the abstract 
signifier is seen as a mimetic form in thought, and thus a deception or an il-
lusion in the Platonic sense, then it would be difficult to accept that value 
could be produced in language in this way, at least for the purposes of artistic 
expression or composition, poetic expression in tropic language.  
      An example of the shifting of Saussure can be found in a comparison of 
the two phrases “Je l’apprends” (I learn it) and “Je la prends” (I take it), 
which have the same sound in speech, which was prioritized by Saussure 
over writing, but a different signification. The signification depends on the 
context in which the phrase occurs, which can provide a clarification, thus 
the value of the sign in signification depends on its relationship to other 
signs. “Each linguistic term derives its value from its opposition to all the 
other terms” (Course in General Linguistics, p. 88), as in chess “the respec-
tive value of the pieces depends on their position on the chessboard,” operat-
ing according to an established set of rules. The established set of rules in 
language governs its operations which take place between the network of 
signifiers in speech and writing and the network of signifiers in thought 
which constitute the signified. While the “cut” or opposition between sound 
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and thought is important in language, the identification between sound and 
thought in language is equally important, which delimits the possibility of 
the transcendental signified in this oppositional linguistics. Both the cut and 
the identification are necessary in order to relate sound to thought, and the 
shifting or play of differences which generates signification takes place on all 
levels, in the network of phonetic signifiers, the network of abstract signifi-
ers, and in the interaction between the two, which is both identificatory and 
oppositional, in a coincidentia oppositorum. 
      Jacques Lacan identified the network of abstract signifieds of Saussure as 
a network of signifiers, and placed the network of phonic signifiers over the 
network of abstract signifiers in the algorithm S/s. The value of the signifier 
is not to be found only within the rules which govern the shifting of phonic 
signifiers, but within the rules of the interactions of the entire system of net-
works between sound and thought. The value of the signifier is determined at 
a certain point in the flux of the interaction of networks, the flux of the play 
of differences, which Lacan calls the “anchoring point.” The anchoring point 
(point de capiton) is that point at which “the signifier stops the otherwise de-
terminate sliding [glissement] of signification” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 303),11 
following the concept of shifting in Saussure. This anchoring point is neces-
sary for a relationship between a signifier in speech and a signifier in 
thought, and it reveals the presence of the unconscious in speech. It is a func-
tion of the context of Saussure, the set of rules which determine the relation-
ships between words in a sentence. In particular, “the diachronic function of 
this anchoring point is to be found in the sentence, even if the sentence com-
pletes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in 
the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its ret-
roactive effect,” as in the instituted trace of Derrida, locating the metaphysic 
within the structure of language itself. The anchoring point is the point at 
which the signification constructed by the sentence intersects, either becom-
ing identical or opposite to, a corresponding signification in the network of 
signifiers in thought. It depends on the same principle as that of Zeno’s para-
dox in the trace: signification is a diachronic event, but is produced at a syn-
chronic point which precludes the possibility of signification. Signification in 
the sentence is only produced retroactively, when the synchronic structure of 
the identification of sound and idea intersects with the diachronic structure of 
speech and thought. 
      The anchoring point in the sentence must stop the glissement of signifiers 
in order for the sentence to signify something. The best example of this is 
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found in an analysis of the structures of metaphor and metonymy, the two 
principal tropes used in figurative language. An analysis of metaphor and 
metonymy also confirms the primacy of the signifier over the signified, or 
speech over thought, for Lacan, in the determination of signification, and in 
the definition of the subject in language. Following the placement of the sig-
nifier over the signified, Lacan established that it is not the subject which 
produces language, but rather language (the Other) which produces the sub-
ject. Metaphor and metonymy are particularly important for the role that they 
play in the constitution of the unconscious of the subject in relation to con-
scious thought, most importantly in the mechanisms of dream work as estab-
lished by Freud, wherein conceptual structures in the unconscious, the 
manifest content of a dream, are transformed into dream images. The two 
principal mechanisms at work in the transference are condensation and dis-
placement, which Lacan sees as forms of metaphor and metonymy in lan-
guage. It is this relationship that allows Lacan to formulate the thesis that the 
unconscious is structured like a language. Other mechanisms of unconscious 
language, such as jokes, glossolalia, neologisms, and even the process of de-
sire, can be described in metaphoric and metonymic terms. 
      A metaphor produces signification by substituting the name of one thing 
for something else, but it is only in the combination of the two names that an 
idea is formed. If the world is a stage, the idea of the stage must be subsumed 
under the sign of the world; a shift or glissement takes place wherein the sig-
nified is transferred from one signifier to another, in what is called signifying 
substitution. It is the process of combination and condensation which pro-
duces the signification, which occurs at the anchoring point of the phrase, the 
point at which the condensation intersects with the equivalent network of 
signifiers in thought, and the idea is retroactively produced in the gap be-
tween the two networks, which is also the point of combination. The anchor-
ing point in the metaphor is the point at which “sense emerges from non-
sense” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 158). In the glissement of the metaphor, the 
signified follows the signifier; the signifier is thus autonomous in relation to 
the signified, and is the determining factor in the production of signification. 
In the glissement, the idea of the world has been effaced or hidden, and re-
placed by the idea of the stage. It remains as a trace, and occupies the gap be-
tween speech and idea. 
      The preceding example of metaphor depends on a particular relationship 
that must be present between each corresponding signifier and signified 
which allows for the transference to take place; the transference is thus gov-
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erned by a specific set of rules, and the signifiers within the metaphor can 
only function in relation to each other. The same is true in the mechanisms of 
the metonym. The metonym is a displacement, a change of name (metono-
ma), the substitution of a descriptive term with another which has no relation 
to the subject term (“the mouth of a river,” for example). The conditions of 
the substitution depend on a pre-inscribed relationship between the subject 
term and the substituted descriptive term, in this case the relation between a 
mouth and water. In metonymy, as opposed to metaphor, the initial signified, 
water in this case, is not eliminated or effaced; it is retained as necessary to 
produce the signification in relation to the substituted signifier. The metonym 
is thus subject to a stricter set of rules than the metaphor, and requires a more 
complex combination of signifiers. 
      Lacan described the function of both metaphor and metonymy with a set 
of algorithms. The metaphoric process is symbolized as: f(S'/S)S ≈  S(+)s. S' 
is the first signifier in the metaphor, S is the second, and the (+) represents 
“the crossing of the bar — and the constitutive value of this crossing for the 
emergence of signification” (p. 164), that is, the anchoring point which pro-
vokes the crossing of the bar between signifier and signified, between con-
scious and unconscious language. A second algorithm for the metaphoric 
process illustrates the importance of the elision of the primary signified in 
order for the metaphor to function: S/$' · $'/x→S(U/s). The S is a signifier, x 
is the unknown signification, s is the signified (idea) created by the meta-
phor, and $', the barred S, is the elision of the substituted signified in the 
glissement. The algorithm for the metonymic process displays the mainte-
nance of the substituted signified in the signification process: f(S…S')S ≈ 
S(—)s. The fact that the bar is not crossed indicates that the division between 
the signifier and signified is maintained, because the substituted signified has 
not been elided. It illustrates that in the metonym there is a certain resistance 
to signification. Of itself, “the mouth of a river” is nonsensical and represents 
an absurdity which “the world is a stage” does not, because it involves a dis-
placement or substitution as well as a simple condensation or combination. It 
is because of this displacement that the substituted signified must be main-
tained, and the anchoring point, or point de capiton, in the process of signifi-
cation is delayed (it does not take place initially), and requires an additional 
association between signifieds in order to take place. These mechanisms can 
then be applied to dream work, in order to understand the structure of the re-
lation between dream thoughts, or manifest content, and dream image, or 
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hallucination, and they can also be applied to the artistic production of visual 
forms, in the transference of thinking to form-making. 
      The transformational methods of Chomsky can be compared to certain 
transformational devices in Platonic philosophies that were developed to 
move from the sensible to the intelligible, from specific forms to formal con-
cepts. These devices include the irregular bodies of matter as derived from 
the regular bodies in the Timaeus of Plato, the dianoetic reasoning of Proclus 
in the Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, and the dia-
grammatic function of polygonal geometries as an allegory of intellect in the 
De circuli quadratura of Nicolas Cusanus. 
      As Noam Chomsky explained in Langauge and Mind in 1968, “accord-
ing to the Port-Royal theory, surface structure corresponds only to sound—to 
the corporeal aspect of language; but when the signal is produced, with its 
surface structure, there takes place a corresponding mental analysis into what 
we may call the deep structure, a formal structure that relates directly not to 
the sound but to the meaning,” that is, the signification. “Propositions that 
interrelate to form the deep structure.…enter into the complex ideas that are 
present to the mind, though rarely articulated in the symbol, when the sen-
tence is uttered” (p. 16). The sentence in language, discursive reason, is the 
particular manifestation of an extensive set of possibilities in a conceptual 
matrix which is implicit in the intellect, the intellectual, in the same way that, 
for example, polygonal figures in the geometry of Nicolas Cusanus are par-
ticular manifestations of the infinite possibilities contained within the figure 
of the circle in De circuli quadratura in the fifteenth century, in the corre-
spondence between the sensible and the intelligible.       
      For Cusanus, polygonal figures are manifestations of mathematical doc-
trines developed in the intellect,12 as the polyhedral solids of Plato are geo-
metrical constructions of the children of the demiurge based on the 
mathematical proportions of the idea, translated into intelligible form. As de-
scribed in the Timaeus (42–43),13 “his children remembered and obeyed their 
father’s orders, and took the immortal principle of the mortal creature, and in 
imitation of their own maker borrowed from the world portions of fire and 
earth, water and air—loans to be eventually repaid—and welded together 
what they had borrowed; the bonding they used was not indissoluble, like 
that by which they were themselves held together,” not archetypal, “but con-
sisted of a multitude of rivets too small to be seen, which held the part of 
each individual body together in a unity. And into this body, subject to the 
flow of growth and decay, they fastened the orbits of the immortal soul.” 
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Thus the universal is inserted into the particular. According to Cusanus, ma-
terial variations are first made visible by mathematical figures, which trans-
form them into geometrical figures, in the same way that for Lacan, 
metaphorical and metonymical processes are represented by algebraic algo-
rithms. 
      In the Timaeus of Plato, the spherical structure of the universe is manifest 
in the architectonics of the soul as fashioned by the demiurge. As the uni-
verse is a “circle moving in a circle, one and solitary, yet by reason of its ex-
cellence able to converse with itself,” the soul, the generating or desiring 
intellect, is constructed of two circles, which are made from two strips which 
are cut from a fabric, and then “placed crosswise at their middle points to 
form a shape like the letter X” (Timaeus 36). The ends are then bent around 
in a circle and fastened to make two circles, the outer circle having the regu-
lar motion of the same, the invisible motion of the eternal, and the inner hav-
ing the irregular motion of the different, the visible motion of the heavenly 
bodies. The geometries operate in the dialectical movement from sensible to 
intelligible, the symbolic content of the geometries in the Timaeus notwith-
standing. The geometries in the Timaeus are employed metaphorically, 
wherein the sensible motion of the different must be elided in order to signify 
the passage from sensible to intelligible. The anchoring point is the axis of 
the X which is formed, the trace which the two geometries have in common. 
      In the De circuli quadratura of Nicolas Cusanus, polygonal geometrical 
figures are manifestations of mathematical doctrines developed in the intel-
lect, as the polyhedral solids of Plato are geometrical constructions based on 
the mathematical proportions of the idea in dianoetic thought, linking the in-
telligible to the sensible. According to Cusanus, material variations are first 
made visible by mathematical figures, as phonetic entities are transformed 
into a syntax. In the Prologue to the Commentary on the First Book of Eu-
clid’s Elements, Proclus stated that mathematics “occupies the middle 
ground between the partless realities—simple, incomposit, and indivisible—
and divisible things characterized by every variety of composition and dif-
ferentiation” (3),14 between discursive reason and that which is beyond it. 
Mathematics is the medium by which pure forms in the intelligible world are 
transformed into the matter of the material world, as copies or representa-
tions, as for Cusanus mathematics transforms material variations into geo-
metrical figures, which are diagrams of those variations, the intersection of 
the conceptual and the physical, thus a transformational relation (Chomsky’s 
term). Geometrical figures are the result of mathematical doctrines devel-
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oped in the intellect, the intersection of intellection and the sensible world, 
the subjective and objective in Hegel’s terms. In the Timaeus, mathematical 
proportions determine the geometrical constitution of the regular solids. 
      Proclus defined the dialectical process of ascending to the intelligibles 
and descending into particulars (Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s 
Elements 8) as the process of analysis and synthesis. For Nicolas Cusanus, 
the dialectical process, which is manifest in the coincidentia oppositorum, 
ascends toward the intelligibles in a process of folding or complicato, or im-
plication, as in the folding of polygonal figures toward a circle in which they 
are inscribed or around which they are circumscribed. The dialectical process 
descends toward the particulars in a process of unfolding or explicato, or ex-
planation, as in the unfolding of the polygonal figures away from the circle. 
For Proclus and Cusanus, mathematics are the means by which the motion of 
bodies can be applied toward the dialectical movement of understanding to-
ward nous, understanding of intelligible reality, the organization of the sen-
sible world which is not present to the senses in perception, the underlying 
conceptual matrix, the deep structure of Chomsky and la langue of Lacan. 
      Mathematical understanding moves in two possible directions, either 
from the limit to the unlimited (in the terms of Proclus, the unlimited being 
the variations of material reality), that is from unity to plurality, or the re-
verse, from multiples back to unities, or from conclusions back to hypothe-
ses, from forms to principles, seeking the underlying principles of nous. In 
the geometrical model of Cusanus, polygonal figures unfold from the circle 
toward multiple subdivisions, and enfold toward the circle, returning to the 
limit of the principle. “Consequently it is only natural,” explained Proclus 
(19), “that the cognitive powers operating in the general science that deals 
with these objects should appear as twofold, some aiming at the unification 
and collection of the manifold for us,” the particular to the universal in the 
Hegelian dialectic, “others at dividing the simple into the diverse, the more 
general into the particular, and the primary ideas into secondary and remoter 
consequences of the principles.” The dianoetic process of mathematical un-
derstanding operates in both directions, in dialectic and discursive thinking. 
According to Proclus, the “range of thinking extends from on high all the 
way down to conclusions in the sense world,” from nous to the objects of 
perception. In the binary dialectical movement, mathematics and geometry 
are able to force the mind out of sense perception and into contemplation of 
the intelligibles of a deep level structure.       
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      Similar relations can thus be seen between deep aspects and surface as-
pects in language, in the linguistic theory of Chomsky, in transformational 
processes from particular to universal, concrete to abstract, and from per-
ceived relations to intelligible relations, which in turn determine the per-
ceived relations and the forms of sensible objects. In Aspects of the Theory of 
Syntax, Chomsky described the transformational relation as such: “A deep 
structure enters the semantic component and receives a semantic interpreta-
tion; it is mapped by the transformational rules into a surface structure, 
which is then given a phonetic interpretation by the rules of the phonological 
component.”15 The transformational rules determine how conceptual rela-
tions (nous, the unconscious) are transformed into language, how language is 
formed and understood in relation to intellect. The rules constitute a system 
of grammatical relations which are made possible by an underlying concep-
tual ordering process. The conceptual matrix is transferred into particular 
sentence structures according to the transformational rules, which determine 
the physical signals which form the sentence, as mathematical relations de-
termine geometrical relations in Proclus and Cusanus. 
      The algorithm of Lacan, S/s, the placing of the signifier over the signi-
fied, and the bar which differentiates them, is designed to suggest the identi-
fication between the signifier and the signified defined by Saussure, in the 
analogy of the two sides of the piece of paper, but at the same time is de-
signed to suggest the inaccessibility of the signifier to the signified, the inac-
cessibility of language to its underlying structure. It is designed to suggest 
the inaccessibility of conscious thought to unconscious thought, in the same 
way that the polygonal figures of Cusanus can never reach the circle in 
which they are inscribed or around which they are circumscribed, no matter 
how many sides the polygon is divided into. According to Jean-Luc Nancy 
and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in The Title of the Letter: A Reading of Lacan, 
“whereas for Saussure, what is essential is the relation (the reciprocity, or the 
association), Lacan introduces a resistance such that the crossing of the bar, 
the relation of the signifier to the signified, in short, the production of signi-
fication itself, will never be self-evident” (p. 36).16 While Saussure allows 
for an arbitrary correspondence between each signifier in language and a par-
ticular element of the underlying syntactical matrix to which it is related, La-
can denied that possibility, and the signifier, the phonetic unit, can only be 
defined in relation to other signifiers. The process of signification is seen as 
autonomous, and “algorithmic.” 
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      The signifier no longer represents something for someone in language, 
but rather represents the subject in language for another signifier, that is, it 
represents the insertion of the speaking subject into the network of signifiers 
that constitute signification. Following Saussure, language is seen as a sys-
tem of differences by Lacan, but now it is an autonomous system with no di-
rect relation to that which is signified. The sliding of the signifier which has 
been identified in the metonymical chain, where the bar between signifier 
and signified is not crossed, constitutes an endless deferral of meaning. 
“Meaning,” though, that which is signified, or a network of conceptual signi-
fiers, or intelligible signifiers in nous, is nevertheless still present as an ab-
sence (as unconscious thought is present to conscious thought as an absence), 
the absence to which the sliding (glissement) of signifiers always refers, as in 
the absence of particulars in the intellectual idea. The absence of the signi-
fied plays the role of the object of desire of the signifying chain, the void 
around which dialectical reason circulates, as in negative theology. The ab-
sence of the signified is the subject itself, which is present in every signifier, 
thus the absence is present in every signifier as a trace.  
      The mechanism of desire in the signifying chain necessitates the trace of 
absence; without the trace of absence, neither the desire nor the process of 
signification would exist. Metonymy is the trope of that desire, in that the bar 
is not crossed, and signification is constantly deferred, while metaphor, in the 
operation of substitution and the eliding of the second signified, enacts the 
mechanisms of that desire in the substitution of the signified for the signifier, 
the substitution of the concept for the word. The object of desire in the meto-
nym is the lack of being, the absence in signification, and the signifying 
chain is a mechanism of deferral. Metaphor and metonymy are seen as con-
stituting the matrix of operational rules which determine language, as math-
ematics and geometry were seen as the underlying matrix which structures 
form. They are also seen as the matrix of operational rules which determine 
unconscious thought. The elision of the signified in the process of significa-
tion is seen as distortion (Enstellung) in the translation of unconscious 
thought into dream images and linguistic manifestations; the metaphoric pro-
cess is seen as condensation (Verdichtung); the metonymic process is seen as 
displacement (Verschiebung); and the translation of images into language in 
general is seen as a particular process of representation (Rücksicht auf Dar-
stellbarkeit). 
      The anchoring point of Lacan in the metonymic mechanism of the auton-
omous process of signification is the bar between the signifier and the signi-
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fied. The bar is seen by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe as an archê or originary 
point in the mechanism, the point beyond which the mechanism cannot be 
reduced, which corresponds to the absence on which the mechanism is predi-
cated. The bar also reifies the presence of the subject in the mechanisms of 
signification, as that absence which is present in every signifier. It is lan-
guage which produces the subject, rather than the subject which produces 
language. But it also renders the subject impossible as soon as it comes into 
that language, because the subject is immediately divided between the con-
cept and the word. The subject is only possible in language, and as soon as 
that possibility is realized in signification, the subject becomes impossible, 
because of the inaccessibility of the signifier to the signified, the premise of 
the presence of the subject. As the presence of the absence in the signifier, 
the subject fades into the signifier, and as the subject can only be represented 
by a signifier to another signifier, it cannot be present in the process of signi-
fication, the shifting or sliding of signifiers above the bar of the signified. For 
the same reason the subject is not present in the transformational relation of 
Chomsky, nor the dialectical reason of Proclus or Cusanus, nor the doubling 
of reason of Hegel, as other than an absence, which is the archê of the mech-
anisms of those signifying processes. 
      As the subject enters language as a negation and is divided by the process 
of signification, the subject is alienated in language, in its participation in the 
symbolic order of Lacan. The subject is self-alienated in the division be-
tween the word and the concept, between sensible reality as perceived and 
experienced and the representation of reality in that perception in language. 
But there must still be a connection in order for language and perception to 
work. For Hegel the subject is self-alienated in self-consciousness, the 
awareness of reason that it is other to itself; the alienation of the subject of 
Lacan presupposes the alienation of the subject of Hegel, because the aliena-
tion of Lacan precedes the mechanisms of discursive reason as given by lan-
guage. In metaphor, a representation cannot take place until a concept is 
erased. “Through the word,” then, “already a presence made of absence—
absence itself gives itself a name…” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 65). The subject 
is alienated in the mimesis of Plato, for whom all perceived form, all per-
ceived reality, is a representation of a concept which precludes the existence 
of the subject prior to its insertion into language, into representation. 
      The subject can only participate in language, in any form of representa-
tion, as divided, as being both present and absent, and absent in its presence. 
The subject must be seen as an effect of language. The self-representation of 
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the subject in language or form-making is a masking of the impossibility of 
the presence of the subject. The subject gains identification in the différance 
of the play of signification in language for Lacan; the subject is caught in the 
reflections and associations between signifiers, between the means of repre-
sentation, as it is caught in the gaze in perception, the play of forms as repre-
sentations, in the same way that the subject of Plotinus is caught between 
mirrors in a play of reflections or representations of both the sensible and in-
telligible. As any signification occurs only retroactively in the course of the 
play of the signifiers, the subject is “thrice removed from reality” in the same 
way that artistic forms are for Plato copies of copies, copies of sensible 
forms which are copies of intelligible ideas. The subject is both defined and 
negated in the play of the veil of reality which defines language and percep-
tion as representation. 
      The being of the subject entails a fundamental lack of self-knowledge, 
which is manifest in the relation between conscious and unconscious 
thought, and in language itself, which always contains the divided subject. 
Lacan explained in Écrits that “the effect of language is the cause introduced 
into the subject. By virtue of this effect, he is not the cause of himself,” be-
cause “his cause is the signifier, without which there would be no subject in 
the real. But this subject is what this signifier represents, and it can never 
represent anything except for another signifier, to which, from that point on, 
the listening subject is reduced.” (p. 835). Therefore, “we don’t speak to the 
subject. That speaks of him, and it is there that he apprehends himself—and 
all the more necessarily so since, before he disappears as a subject beneath 
the signifier that he becomes because of the sole fact that that addresses him, 
he was absolutely nothing.”17      
      The alienation of the subject from itself in its representation in language 
is only perpetuated by language, which deepens the condition of self-
alienation and lack of self-knowledge in the pretense of representation. The 
production of signification in the play of signifiers in the pretense of repre-
sentation in language is defined by Lacan as signifiance, a neologism which 
is translated as “significance” by Alan Sheridan in Écrits, A Selection, but is 
better to be left as signifiance, according to Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe. Signifiance refers not to significance or signification, but 
to the operation of signification, which is the glissement of the signifier 
above the bar between signifier and signified; it is thus a signification with-
out signification, but rather a signification which “makes signification possi-
ble” (The Title of the Letter, p. 62). The key element of signifiance is the 
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absence of the signified, or the transformation of the signified into the signi-
fier. It is a play of signification that is not preceded by signification, a sur-
face structure which is not preceded by a deep structure, but rather creates a 
deep structure in the pretense of representation.  
      Ultimately it is impossible to signify or represent anything other than the 
impossibility of signification or representation, other than the absence of the 
subject in representation. The location of any possible signified in the meta-
phoric or metonymic process is taken place by a signifier in the necessary 
shifting of the signifier in the production of discourse; any hole which ap-
pears must be covered up, as discourse is a veil which covers the absence of 
the subject. Discourse must appear as a totality or manifold in order to repre-
sent intellection. The signifier assumes the role of the signified, thus all sig-
nification can be located in the mechanisms of language itself. It is the 
absence of the signified which drives the signifying process itself in its at-
tempt to compensate for that lack. 
      The signifying process then entails, in the inability of crossing the bar in-
to the signified, the pushing of the limit of signification to the bar. In the 
complicato of Cusanus, the polygonal figure, the process of signification, is 
pushed to the limit of the circle, the signified, but can never arrive at it or be-
come it; such an arrival is only possible in nous, in the intelligible, or the in-
tellectual of Plotinus, that element of human intellect in which the One or 
divine is participant, and which in fact entails the negation of the subject. In 
the Enneads of Plotinus: “When we seize anything in the direct intellectual 
act there is room for nothing else than to know and to contemplate the object; 
the subject is not included in the act of knowing, but asserts itself, if at all, 
later and is a sign of the altered…” (IV.4.1).18 Representation in signification 
constitutes the elision and division of the subject for Plotinus as well. 
      Crossing the bar of the signified means revealing the absence of the sig-
nified, thus the absence of the subject, in the process of signification, and 
would negate the signification, the division between the physical and the 
conceptual, between reason and that which it perceives. In metaphor the sig-
nifier both slides along the bar and crosses over it. According to Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe, “to pass over to the level of the signified,” in Lacan’s 
Écrits, A Selection (p. 155), “is always, and perhaps can only be, to pass to 
the limit of the signified, in other words, without crossing that limit (or hav-
ing already exceeded it, but precisely in such a way that the signified is im-
mediately exhausted, punctuation dissolved and sliding perpetuated). One 
should consequently maintain these two theses simultaneously—certainly not 
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an easy task: signifiance crosses the bar, and signifiance only slides along the 
bar” (The Title of the Letter, p. 62). This simultaneity is given by the fact that 
signification, the production of the signified, is in fact achieved without the 
participation of the signified. The punctuation, or anchoring point, the point 
at which signification is retroactively produced in the tropic chain, produces 
a signification which is not a signification, in which the signified is trans-
formed into the signifier, and the ruse of representation is maintained in rela-
tion to the subject in language. Unconscious thought is present in language, 
but only as an absence. 
      The Saussurean relation between signifier and signified is thus qualified 
as one of impossibility and permanent division, and it is the division, the bar 
which resists a direct relationship, which is the originary condition of signifi-
cation, the archê of representation in language. Signification in language al-
ways necessitates a negotiation of that archê, of that impossibility, of the one 
unchangeable condition of expression. The autonomy of the signifier is only 
a result of that condition, as all intelligible forms in the Timaeus are only the 
result of archetypal forms. As Lacan explained, “the thematics of this science 
is henceforth suspended, in effect, at the primordial position of the signifier 
and the signified as being distinct orders separated initially by a bar resisting 
signification,” and “that is what was to make possible an exact study of the 
conditions proper to the signifier, and of the extent of their function in the 
genesis of the signified” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 149). The bar between the 
signifier and the signified is that which metaphysics has always attempted to 
overcome; the psychoanalytic model of Lacan causes a displacement of the 
metaphysic in language, moving it back into the structure of language, as a 
function of unconscious processes, in the construction of reason and percep-
tion. But as in the différance of Deconstruction, the metaphysical can still be 
seen to be present, just displaced. 
      The signification which does not cross the bar between the signifier and 
the signified constitutes the “unmotivated sign” in language. The unmotivat-
edness of the sign, in its relation between signifier and signified, contributes 
to the motivation of the signifier in the sliding of signification above the bar, 
as it takes place within the illusion of representation. The “philosophy of the 
sign,” according to Lacan, is replaced by the “science of the letter,” and “we 
will fail to pursue the question further as long as we cling to the illusion that 
the signifier answers to the function of representing the signified, or better, 
that the signifier has to answer for its existence in the name of any significa-
tion whatever” (p. 150). The mechanism of the science of the letter for Lacan 
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is the algorithm, which is a signifier which does not signify, a pure mathe-
matics which disrupts the relation between signifier and signified.  
      The signifier is removed from the sign in language, and is divested of its 
traditional linguistic function. The algorithm is seen as a “hole” in significa-
tion, and is composed of purely differential logic, based on the “logic of the 
signifier.” From Saussure, “the signifier is constituted only from a synchron-
ic and enumerable collection of elements in which each is sustained only by 
the principle of its opposition to each of the others” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 
304), as described by Lacan. From Plato, mathematics is based on the per-
ception of opposites in sensible reality, in particular day and night. “If lin-
guistics enables us to see the signifier as the determinant of the signified, 
analysis reveals the truth of this relation by making the ‘holes’ in meaning 
the determinates of its discourse” (p. 299). It is the gaps in discourse, the la-
cunae, the scotomata, the méconnaissance (inability to know or understand, 
misconstruction or failure to recognize, especially on the part of conscious 
reason in relation to itself), which determine the relation of discourse to the 
subject, as traces of the bar between the signifier and the signified, between 
language and the subject, and which reveal the presence of unconscious 
thought within conscious thought.       
      The organization of the play of the signifier in signifiance is based on the 
presence of the holes in signification. The holes are seen as the chôra, which 
was described by Derrida as “something that cannot be represented, except 
negatively.…It is a space that cannot be represented, so it is a challenge to 
anything solid, to architecture as something built.”19 The chôra was de-
scribed in the Timaeus (52) as “space which is eternal and indestructible, 
which provides a position for everything that comes to be, and which is ap-
prehended without the senses by a sort of spurious reasoning and so is hard 
to believe in,” thus “we look at it indeed in a kind of dream and say that eve-
rything that exists must be somewhere and occupy some space, and that what 
is nowhere in heaven or earth is nothing at all.”  
      The chôra is a space which is other than space, which allows for the be-
coming of space, as signifiance is, in the science of the letter, signification 
which is other than signification, and which allows for the becoming of sig-
nification. The chôra is only given in a dream, that is, in unconscious 
thought, as it is interpreted in the mechanisms of language. According to Pla-
to, “because of this dream state we are not awake to the distinctions we have 
drawn and others akin to them, and fail to state the truth about the true and 
unsleeping reality: namely that whereas an image, the terms of whose exist-
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ence are outside its control in that it is always a moving shadow of some-
thing else, needs to come into existence in something else if it is to claim 
some degree of reality, or else be nothing at all….” The chôra is the becom-
ing place of the image as signification in language, so it is the production of 
the intelligible form in the imagination, in the void between intellection and 
sensible reality. It is the place of the transformation of the manifest content 
of a dream, the dream thought, into a dream image; and it is the space be-
neath the signification of both the image and signifier in language, the space 
which is the absence of the subject in the intellectual, the absence of the sig-
nified in the process of intellection. 
      The anchoring point, the point de capiton, in the glissement of signifi-
ance, is a chôra, a place which is not a place. Like the chôra of Plato, the an-
choring point of Lacan is presented as a myth, a necessary construction of 
reason, as knowledge of the unconscious is a myth. As Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe described it, “there is no signification which is not always already 
sliding outside of its alleged proper meaning” (The Title of the Letter, p. 54). 
In Lacan’s words, quoted in The Title of the Letter from a 1958 seminar, “be-
tween the two chains…that of the signifiers in relation to the circulation of 
traveling signifieds which are always in the process of sliding, the pinning-
down or anchoring point I am speaking about or even the anchoring point is 
mythical, for no one has ever been able to pin a signification onto a signifi-
er….” The anchoring point, like the bar between the signifier and signified, 
is an archê, an apeiron, a source of origin which does not exist.       
      The apeiron is a chôra which exceeds the physical and temporal permu-
tations of matter, as the anchoring point in the tropic sequence is that point 
which exceeds the mechanisms of language and introduces the crossing of 
the bar between the signifier and signified, as a mythological event. The an-
choring point, as the chôra, provides a receptacle for the process of change, 
the tropic glissement, in language. The anchoring point is the zero point, the 
hole, in the flux of signification (signifiance) in language, the point at which 
the network of signifiers both passes along the bar and crosses over it, the 
point at which the signifiers in language leave an impress which produces 
signification, as a transformational relation. 
      The concept of the signified is not excluded from Lacanian linguistics, 
but it is displaced within the process of signification, as is the metaphysic. 
The signifier is initially that which resists the possibility of signification, or 
posits a bar between signifier and signified, as in the algorithm f(S)I/s. In the 
metonymic process, the bar is maintained between signifier and signified; the 
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signifiers slide along the bar, and the presence of the elided signified is mani-
fest as absence, or lack of being, within the chain of signifiers itself, in the 
nonsensical or irrational quality of the metonym. Thus the algorithm f(S…S') 
≈  S(—)s, in which the bar is maintained in relation to the sliding of the sig-
nifiers. In the metaphoric process, the bar is crossed in the elision of the sec-
ond signified, in the positing of a presence of an absence in relation to the 
chain of signifiers, that which allows the chain of signifiers to create signifi-
cation. The crossing of the bar is the myth of reason introduced by the an-
choring point in the sliding of the signifiers, which introduces the void of 
signification as an element in the signifying process. Thus the algorithm 
f(S'/S)S ≈ S(+)s. The crossing of the bar is constituted by the substitution of 
one signifier for another and the elision of the proper signified. It is thus a 
process of negation, and in particular the negation of the subject in language.  
      Substitution in metaphor renders “signification inaccessible to the con-
scious subject,” according to Lacan (Écrits, A Selection, p. 166), to discur-
sive reason, while metonymy enacts a perpetual desire which is always a 
desire for that which is not there, the absence in being which metonymy 
stages. “The signifying game between metonymy and metaphor, up to and 
including the active edge that splits my desire between a refusal of the signi-
fier and a lack of being, and links my fate to the question of my destiny, this 
game, in all its inexorable subtlety, is played until the match is called, there 
where I am not, because I cannot situate myself there.” The result is “the rad-
ical excentricity of the self to itself with which man is confronted” (p. 171), 
as in the thought of Hegel. The gap (écart) which has been identified in sig-
nification in language can only be associated with a creation of a gap in the 
subject (s’écarte), a tearing or dehiscence, and that which is torn away (écar-
telé) within the subject, according to Lacan. Signification is not possible 
without the presence of absence, the absence of both the subject and being, 
which are both necessarily negated in the signifying chain. Language is the 
product of a subject which is not present to itself, which is dictated by un-
conscious processes, thus the conscious subject is a product of language, the 
symbolic order, the Other. The conscious subject is assured of its presence in 
language even by its absence, and the negation of being; language is thus the 
Platonic veil which reaffirms the participation of the conscious subject in the 
world through perception, but which is an illusion. 
      In Of Grammatology, Derrida described the instituted trace in language 
as maintaining language as a structure of differences in the Saussurean sense. 
The presence of absence in the trace is not a metaphysical presence, but ra-
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ther a structural presence in the science of the letter. The trace makes signifi-
cation possible, as is shown by Lacan in the point de capiton in the sliding of 
the signifying chain, the point at which absence is made present, and the un-
conscious enters into conscious discourse. The signifying chain is a structure 
of differences, through which signification is produced. In the “‘unmotivat-
edness’ of the sign,” the sliding of the signifier above the bar in signifiance, 
“a synthesis in which the completely other is announced” (p. 47) is achieved, 
as described by Derrida, in the presence of absence, of the unconscious. The 
trace is “where the relationship with the other is marked,” the crossing of the 
bar, and, as in the metaphoric chain of Lacan, “the movement of the trace is 
necessarily occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other 
announces itself as such, it presents itself in the dissimulation of itself.” The 
trace is thus never present, it is only present as absence. The other, the un-
conscious, is only known as absence in conscious thought, in the structural 
mechanisms of language, making possible and precluding the possibility at 
the same time of all presence. 
      Similarly, in the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel, spirit, described as 
the inner being of the world, “assumes objective, determinate form, and en-
ters into relations with itself—it is externality (otherness), and exists for 
self…” (p. 86).20 It doubles itself in its otherness, and it is through the dou-
bling of itself as otherness or externality that it participates in the particular. 
Mind becomes object, but as object it is immediately negated; it becomes 
self-reflected in the object which is the product of its doubling, as reason it-
self is reflected in the object which is the product of its doubling. Mind or 
spirit, as it is inaccessible, can be seen as the absence which allows for pres-
ence in language. The synthesis of mind and perceived object, subjective and 
objective, ideal and real, is the absolute. As with the archê of the bar be-
tween signifier and signified of Lacan, the trace is an absolute for Derrida, a 
form of an archê. For Derrida it is the otherness retained within the trace 
which is the necessary condition for the movement of differences, as for He-
gel it is the otherness (an inverse otherness) of spirit in matter which is the 
necessary condition for the dialectic between the subjective and objective. 
According to Derrida, “The (pure) trace is différance,” the condition of the 
movement which produces difference, which “does not depend on any sensi-
ble plentitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic” (Of Grammatology, p. 
62). Différance is mind or the intellectual, which negates itself in its dou-
bling of itself in otherness. Although différance (mind) “does not exist, alt-
hough it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by 
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rights anterior to all that one calls sign (signifier/signified, con-
tent/expression, etc.), concept or operation, motor or sensory.”  
      Like the mind of Hegel and the intellectual of Plotinus, différance is ante-
rior to and inaccessible to the laws of discursive reason in language, which 
are predicated on objective self-doubling and negation, the production of dif-
ference. Différance “founds the metaphysical opposition between the sensi-
ble and intelligible, then between signifier and signified, expression and 
content, etc.” Thus the presence of the metaphysical in différance. It is the 
ground for the possibility of the dialectic of the metaphysic, which is given 
by the structure of language. The rhetorical figure in language, such as the 
metaphor or metonym, as the enactment of différance (Derrida) or signifi-
ance (Lacan), contains the metaphysic within it, and the subjective spirit of 
Hegel, in the absence contained within the linguistic structure, within the 
limits of conscious reason, and contains the hole as well, which is the pres-
ence (as absence) of the unconscious. The trace does not participate in the 
dialectic or the metaphysic; it is neither real nor ideal, sensible nor intelligi-
ble, but is anterior to all, the ground on which reason operates in language, 
according to Derrida (Of Grammatology, p. 65). 
      Spacing in language is “the unperceived, the nonpresent, and the uncon-
scious” (p. 68), the mechanism of différance which corresponds to the an-
choring point of Lacan, as found in the transformational relation and the 
rhetorical figure. Spacing is an “arche-writing” which only occurs in ab-
sence, in the effect of the unconscious. As in the paradox of Zeno, it occurs 
between idea and perception. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, it occurs between 
consciousness and perception, and is the mechanism of the gaze in percep-
tion, or the real, that which is inaccessible to the symbolic or imaginary, lan-
guage or perception, as in the One of Plotinus. The conceptual must negate 
the physical form, as in language the trope overcomes the lack of sense, and 
the physical form must negate the conceptual, as in language the trope con-
ceals the signified. In that way a sort of dialectic is enacted in the spacing of 
différance, in the relation between the intelligible form and sensible form. 
      A mechanism which results from the spacing of différance in writing is 
the “graft.” In Margins of Philosophy, Derrida explained that “writing, as a 
classical concept, entails predicates that have been subordinated, excluded, 
or held in abeyance by forces and according to necessities to be analyzed.”21 
It is those predicates “whose force of generality, generalization, and genera-
tivity is liberated, grafted onto a ‘new’ concept of writing that corresponds as 
well to what has always resisted the prior organization of forces, always con-
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stituted the residue irreducible to the dominant force organizing the hierar-
chy that we may refer to, in brief, as logocentric.” Thus “to leave this new 
concept the old name of writing is to maintain the structure of the graft, the 
transition and indispensable adherence to an effective intervention in the 
constituted historical field.” The graft is a mechanism for the enactment of 
spacing in différance in writing. The graft is an intervention into the pre-
existing structure of language, for the purpose of exposing the repressions of 
the structure of language, and overcoming them. The graft begins with oppo-
sitions, differences in the structure of language, the opposition of signifiers, 
and then proceeds to the displacement of those oppositions, in particular the 
displacement of metaphysical oppositions, which rely on the pre-inscribed 
correspondence between the signifier and the signified. Signifiers in lan-
guage are taken out of the oppositions in which they are generated, and are 
recombined in ways which expose the scotomata or absences which the met-
aphysical oppositions concealed.       
      As for Lacan, the subject of Derrida is both constituted and dislocated or 
negated in language, in spacing and the graft. “Spacing as writing is the be-
coming-absent and the becoming-unconscious of the subject” (Of Gramma-
tology, p. 69). In Lacanian terms it is the fading of the subject into the 
signifier, and the loss of the subject below the bar between signifier and sig-
nified, in the glissement of signifiance. Spacing is the becoming-unconscious 
of the subject (as signifier) because it is the point at which the unconscious 
enters into language, when the absence becomes a presence. “The hinge 
[Grisure] marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a 
signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute pres-
ence,” or a totality given by intellection, because the bar resisting the signifi-
er to the signified requires an absence, which is manifest in the play of 
difference. There is thus no possibility of a “full speech” (in expression), a 
speech which is not perforated by the holes which are the presence of ab-
sence in spacing, which reveal the mechanisms of the unconscious, which 
disrupts full speech, and makes it impossible. A language is only wholly 
comprehensible within conscious thought or discursive reason, and such a 
language conceals and represses the dialectic between conscious and uncon-
scious thought. The presence of the absence in spacing reveals the intellectu-
al in discursive reason.      
      Différance was described by Derrida as a form of desiring-production, in 
the enactment of the continuous desire for presence, the desire of the subject 
in its elision. The mechanism of the desiring of presence is the opposition be-
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tween presence and absence, which creates the desire for presence, and 
makes presence impossible at the same time. The opposition between pres-
ence and absence is in the relation between conscious and unconscious 
thought, perception and intellection; it is the presence of the unconscious in 
conscious thought (as absence) which creates desire for presence. The sub-
ject can never be self-present to itself, because it can never be conscious of 
its unconscious mechanisms. Consciousness is an illusion. The movement of 
différance is death, because it is finite, and because conscious desire is the 
desire for death, as is seen in the dialectic between the sensible and intelligi-
ble, the particular and universal, that is, the metaphysic. Desire in language is 
the enactment of the Freudian death drive, the desire of organic life. Abstrac-
tion in thought is the purest representation of the desire for death, according 
to Wilhelm Worringer, which is played out in différance. 
      The movement along the signifying chain in différance, as in signifiance, 
is in anticipation of death, as is the production of symbols in imagination, the 
creation of the intelligible form. Imagination according to Derrida is a signi-
fying supplement which is the self-representation of life as non-being, or 
death. The image is the self-reference of life “to its own lack, to its own wish 
for a supplement” (Of Grammatology, p. 184). The supplement is necessary 
because of the absence of the subject in being. In the Phenomenology of 
Spirit of Hegel, mind (universal, concept) is recognized in the particular 
(sensible, form) when the self “has consciousness and distinguishes itself as 
‘other’, or as world, from itself [imagination]” (774). The self must become 
an other to itself before it can recognize itself as mind; it must become self-
alienated, and see its existence as alien to being (death). For Lacan, the point 
at which the self becomes alienated from its own being is the objet a, the 
juncture between the symbolic structure and what is beyond signification, the 
real. The image in imagination for Derrida is the other of the self as represen-
tation, and reaffirms the alienation of the self to being in its own self-
representation: “The presence of the represented is constituted with the help 
of the addition to itself of that nothing which is the image, announcement of 
its dispossession within its own representer and within its death” (Of Gram-
matology, p. 184). Representation is an absence in itself. 
      Art and death go hand in hand in the “originary iteration” (p. 209) of rep-
etition, reproduction and representation. Mimesis itself is a supplement, a 
substitute, caused by the self-alienation of reason, and is inscribed in the pro-
cess of différance, inscribed in the spacing which is the origin of the sign. 
The movement of signification in différance is perpetuated by the possibility 
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of the loss of that movement, a movement which is predicated on self-
alienation, and which carries death and absence of being, and which consti-
tutes an abyss. The point of the loss of signification is the point at which “the 
signifier can no longer be replaced by its signified” (p. 266), where the signi-
fied becomes the “terminal point of all references” and threatens the system 
with collapse. Such a signified is present in all signs in the signifying system 
(différance); it is, of course, the subject, the unconscious thought of the sub-
ject, which threatens the collapse of conscious thought in language and per-
ception. Language endlessly propels prohibition and transgression in a 
dialectical relationship between self-preservation and self-destruction. The 
point of movement beyond signification, the objet a of Lacan, does not exist, 
but it is present in all factors of signification, and constitutes it as supplement 
to lack of being. 
      Signification in différance is ultimately what Derrida described in Of 
Grammatology as a supplement, filling in for the absence which desire seeks 
to overcome in presence. All expression, in language and art, is a supplement 
designed to fill a void, the hole in conscious thought, the inaccessibility of 
the unconscious. “Writing is dangerous from the moment that representation 
there claims to be presence and the sign of the thing itself. And there is a fa-
tal necessity, inscribed in the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute 
make one forget the vicariousness of its own function and make itself pass 
for the plenitude of speech whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless on-
ly supplements” (p. 144). It is the task of any form of expression in art not to 
conceal its role as supplement, not to conceal the presence of the uncon-
scious in conscious thought. In order to reveal itself as supplement, the art 
form must contain both presence and absence, and must contain the re-
sistance of the signifier to the signified in its structure. Such is the difference 
between literal speech and figurative, tropic speech, the absence of the signi-
fied, and the presence of the unconscious as absence. Figurative speech is 
necessary as the enactment of the desire of reason, but it is always supple-
mental, and a necessary sign of the human condition. 
      The concept of the supplement determines the concept of the representa-
tive image. The supplement represents both a presence and an absence, the 
absence which it is designed to replace. The sign in language is a supple-
ment, and it always contains both presence and absence, the absence of the 
thing which it represents in signification. The advent of language itself as 
presence denies the possibility of the presence of that which it represents, the 
object in perception. Literal language, and literal forms in art, have no rela-
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tion, or are other to, sensible forms in perception, as forms of mimesis in-
volving only discursive reason. Figurative language, and figurative forms in 
art, reintroduce the presence of the elided object in representation, as ab-
sence, the absence created by the representation. The supplement contains 
“the power of substitution that permits us to absent ourselves and act by 
proxy, through representation, through the hands of others. Through the writ-
ten, this substitution always has the form of the sign. The scandal is that the 
sign, the image, or the representer, become forces and make ‘the world 
move’” (p. 147). The supplement is the substitution for the absence of being 
in thought, and in its manifestation as presence as supplement, only reinforc-
es that absence. All figurative language is supplement, and enacts the desire 
for presence. 
      Language is seen as supplement as “the regulated substitution of signs for 
things” (p. 149), but it is impossible to see that which is supplemented, as it 
is impossible to see the unconscious. Supplement is generated by a desire for 
which there is no object available to consciousness, other than death. The de-
sire is an unconscious desire, the mechanism of desire from the unconscious 
which filters into conscious discourse through the mechanisms of tropic lan-
guage, in the signifying chain, which can never see the object of its desire, 
the absence in presence, the void in conscious thought. Supplement is “repre-
sentation in the abyss of presence” (p. 163), desiring the presence of the ab-
sence of the unconscious, and “the desire of presence is…born from the 
abyss (the indefinite multiplication) of representation, from the representa-
tion of representation, etc.” The abyss is the infinite in the presence of repre-
sentation, as in the unlimited of Proclus, the infinite multiplicity of dianoetic 
reason as manifest in mathematics and geometry, as it infinitely approaches 
the limit of the One, the finiteness of absence.  
      There is no such thing as the indefinite multiplication of representation, 
but representation appears indefinite because it cannot see the object of its 
desire, nor the source of its desire, which is its own abyss. Différance poses 
the indefinite multiplication of representation; in différance it is the archê of 
the trace which momentarily arrests the movement of desire, while in signifi-
ance it is the punctuation, or point de capiton of Lacan in the signifying 
chain. Desire is arrested momentarily because absence is made present, the 
presence of the unconscious in absence, but the presence, the momentary ar-
rest, is only a trace, not a temporal event, as in Zeno’s paradox, and thus re-
mains inaccessible to discursive reason or conscious thought, and unable to 
appease desire, the desire of reason for its own non-being. 
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      In the Phenomenology of Spirit, desire is the determinate self-
perpetuation of self-consciousness around the void of its other, the desire of 
reason in relation to that which is perceived. Desire is the objectification of 
self-differentiation in self-consciousness, which is différance, the process of 
reason confronting its self-negation in its self-representation. Desire is the 
continuous re-constitution of reason in non-reason, that is, the self-
preservation of conscious thought in relation to unconscious thought. It is the 
enactment of the self-differentiated and self-alienated identity of reason. Dif-
ferentiation is a function of desire in reason, the necessity of perpetually cre-
ating the self-negation of the other in reason, which is a function of the death 
instinct in desire, the necessity of differentiation and negation. 
      Presence is the absence of différance, according to Derrida (Of Gramma-
tology, p. 166); différance is thus a mechanism of unconscious thought. Pres-
ence in thought is consciousness, the presence of reason to itself, concealing 
the absence which is unconscious thought. Différance is other than conscious 
thought, as it is “to think the present from time,” in which presence is an ab-
sence, in the intellectual or a priori intuition of Kant, rather than to think time 
from the present. Différance, being neither presence nor absence, is structure, 
structure as supplement. Derrida explained, “Here structure means the irre-
ducible complexity within which one can only shape or shift the play of 
presence or absence: that within which metaphysics can be produced but 
which metaphysics cannot think” (p. 167), because, ultimately, it is itself a 
metaphysic, a structural metaphysic, because it is a concept which contains 
presence and absence. It is not metaphysics which cannot think différance 
(metaphysics does not think), but rather conscious thought itself, because dif-
férance is the logic of the unconscious, that which is inaccessible to discur-
sive reason, conscious thought. 
      For Lacan, that which is repressed in the traditional metaphysic of logo-
centric writing is the subject, because in the discourse of reason, the subject 
is identified with writing, and with speech. Signification outside of signifi-
ance, the correspondence between the signifier and the signified, produces a 
disguise of the speaking subject, but since the subject is only present as an 
absence, as non-being, the disguise of language only disguises nothing, the 
nothing which is absorbed into the continuous opposition of the signifying 
chain. The subject as absence is opposed to the signification which is its dis-
guise, and which is taken as its representation. Writing is no longer seen as 
that which is adequate to something, but that which is inadequate, as con-
scious thought and discursive reason, and language and perception by them-
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selves, are no longer seen as adequate to something, but that which is inade-
quate in the constitution of the subject. In order to represent that which is 
other to itself in language, reason must necessarily become altered and self-
alienated as it enters language, as the subject assumes its role in the signify-
ing structure, following Hegel. The subject is the only possibility of signifi-
cation in language, and the loss of the subject in language necessitates the 
loss of the metaphysic in language, as the metaphysic is the definition of the 
subject. The loss is contained within the opposition of significance, and sig-
nifiance is the dialectic of the identity of the subject, the Hegelian dialectic 
played out prior to the establishment of consciousness. 
      The structure of the relationship between signifier and signifier in the 
signifying chain in signifiance is the structure of the subject. Thus for Lacan 
“a signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier” (Écrits, 
A Selection, p. 316). The subject is always present in the signifying chain, in 
every signifier, but only present as an absence. The presence of the subject is 
the void of being in the signifying chain; the subject is present as “excentric” 
to itself in the supplement of representation. The excentricity of the subject is 
based on “Hegel’s insistence on the fundamental identity of the particular 
and the universal,” and “it is certainly psychoanalysis that provides it with its 
paradigm by revealing the structure in which that identity is realized as dis-
junctive of the subject” (p. 80). Through discourse, “it is the [conscious] sub-
ject who introduces division into the individual, as well as into the 
collectivity that is his equivalent. Psychoanalysis is properly that which re-
veals both the one and the other to be no more than mirages.” The subject is 
distinguished from the “individual” because the subject is always the think-
ing subject, and it is the reason of the thinking subject which is seen as a mi-
rage in relation to the identity of the individual, the subjective of Hegel. 
Although the unconscious is present in the discourse of Derrida, it is never 
acknowledged, and the individual for Derrida is always the thinking subject. 
While the presence of unconscious discourse determines to a large extent the 
mechanisms of différance, spacing and grafting, it is necessary to turn to the 
psychoanalysis of Lacan in order to determine their consequences for crea-
tivity, if creativity is to be the product of the individual, in the interaction of 
conscious and unconscious thought, and not just the thinking subject in dis-
cursive reason. 
      The Hegelian identity between the particular and the universal is the syn-
thesis in the dialectic between the sensible and intelligible. The identity is 
based on the dialectic between consciousness in perception and self-
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consciousness in discursive reason, and the synthesis of the two, which is 
mind. The dialectic between consciousness and self-consciousness is predi-
cated on the self-doubling of the subject, the thinking subject, in conscious-
ness, and its self-alienation and excentricity in its recognition of its otherness 
in perception in self-consciousness. The excentricity of the subject, its dis-
junctiveness in self-consciousness, is introduced by Hegel, and it is the goal 
of psychoanalysis, according to Lacan, to formulate the structure of the iden-
tity of the disjunctive subject. The first principle in psychoanalysis is the 
identification of the mirage of (Hegelian) consciousness in the thinking sub-
ject, and the mirage of discursive reason itself, in relation to the identity of 
the individual. The consequence in language is the identification of the dis-
junctive subject in tropic expression, in revealing the presence of uncon-
scious discourse in language and perception, and the formulation of the 
structure of signifiance, signification in relation to the disjunctive subject. 
      The structure of signifiance of Lacan is similar to the structure of the dif-
férance of Derrida, who acknowledged the invention of the Freudian uncon-
scious as a determining factor in the future structure of discourse, but who 
more or less uses the structure of the Freudian psyche as an analogy for strat-
egies in writing, and is not really interested in the re-conceptualization of the 
individual, or even the thinking subject, as the source of a particular dis-
course. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, on the other hand, a different structure 
of the individual and the thinking subject is introduced, beginning with the 
Hegelian structures of consciousness and the Freudian structures of the psy-
che, and filtering them through the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de 
Saussure in particular. Lacan arrived at many of the same conclusions as 
Derrida in his reading of Saussure, but for Lacan the importance of the iden-
tity of the subject is always preserved. Lacan is more of a structuralist than 
Derrida, but that is inevitable, as both the unconscious and the psyche are 
structures. The departure from structuralism on the part of the post-
structuralists is located in the overcoming of the logocentrism of the com-
plicity between the signifier and signified in language, and the abandonment 
of that complicity altogether. Lacan reformulates the complicity rather than 
completely abandon it, although in the end the metaphysic of it is as irrele-
vant to Lacanian discourse as it is to post-structuralism. 
      Lacan rejected the possibility of the synthesis in the Hegelian dialectic, in 
which reason is reunited with itself in its self-alienation, which Lacan called 
the “logicizing Aufhebung” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 294), and described as “a 
permanent revisionism, in which truth is in a state of constant re-absorption 
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in its own disturbing element, being in itself no more than that which is lack-
ing for the realization of knowledge” (p. 296), given by the limitations of the 
framing of reason in consciousness, thus conscious reason in the thinking 
subject. The dialectic, in its limitation, provides the basis for the perspective 
of the subject in psychoanalysis as disjunctive prior to conscious thought, 
given the role of the unconscious. Hegel provides the possibility of progres-
sive self-alienation, as a dialectical process without completion, as a basis for 
the structuring of the conceptual process in relation to the make-up of the in-
dividual. The basis for Lacan’s departure from Hegel is in the concept of the 
other, the inter-personal relationships that constitute the individual, which are 
absent from Hegel’s philosophy, and the concept of the Other, the symbolic 
order in which reason participates, to which it is subject, independent of it-
self a priori, in opposition to the Hegelian concept that the symbolic order is 
a macrocosm of reason. It is the Other, the matrix of language which is the 
basis of the unconscious, which sustains the mirage of consciousness and 
conscious reason, while at the same time ensuring the impossibility of its re-
absorption in the dialectic.  
      The Other is a mediator between consciousness and self-consciousness, 
that which disrupts the dialectic of consciousness through the intervention of 
the unconscious, which is nothing other than the Other itself, the linguistic 
structure of the symbolic order. The other is presented in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit of Hegel as belonging to the particular, the objective, outside of 
concept, the subjective, and that which presents itself in reason as other than 
reason, but not within reason itself, as it becomes for Lacan. The exterior 
other of Hegel is equally responsible for the mechanisms of desiring-reason 
in signification. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (174), “The simple ‘I’ is this 
genus or the simple universal, for which the differences are not differences 
only by its being the negative essence of the shaped independent moments; 
and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other 
that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-
consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other,” self-
consciousness “explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of 
the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the cer-
tainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for 
self-consciousness itself in an objective manner.”  
      Self-consciousness is dependent on the nothingness of the other, which is 
why consciousness in psychoanalysis is rendered invalid as a source of iden-
tity in reason; the other becomes something, with which reason is forced to 
Jacques Lacan                                                                                                39 
 
come to terms. The mechanisms of the particular in reason are the same, in 
relation to the universal; the result, desire, is still present in the same way, 
but the structure of the ‘I’ is changed. In the following section in the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit (175), in this “satisfaction, however, experience makes 
it aware that the object has its own independence. Desire and the self-
certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-
certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession 
can take place, there must be this other.” Thus “self-consciousness, by its 
negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of 
that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well.” The 
certainty of self-consciousness becomes an impossibility in itself, but for dif-
ferent reasons than for Lacan. “It is in fact something other than self-
consciousness that is the essence of desire”: desire is relocated in a place out-
side of self-consciousness, but Hegel cannot name it. “On account of the in-
dependence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the 
object itself effects the negation within itself….” Negation is present in the 
other, as absence, and the negation is necessarily within self-consciousness, 
in the mechanisms of discursive reason and conscious thought, in the same 
way that absence is present in the signifier in the signifying chain of the 
structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, though the other is redefined 
in relation to the structure of the unconscious. 
      The definition of Freud of the unconscious as the Other in reason 
“brought within the circle of science the boundary between the object and 
being that seemed to mark its outer limit” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 175), ac-
cording to Lacan. The metaphysic was now the subject of the science of the 
letter, displaced into the function of language as the function of the relation 
between conscious and unconscious thought. The negativity or absence of 
being that constitutes the other, and thus the constitution of conscious 
thought, was continued from the Hegelian dialectic, but the reconciliation of 
self-alienated consciousness is no longer possible. Nevertheless, as Nancy 
and Lacoue-Labarthe conclude in The Title of the Letter, “if in Lacan this 
principle remains affected by a negativity which seems to resist the positive 
conversion during the progress of the stages of consciousness in Hegel (or if, 
in other words, it is a question here of an un-conscious), such a determination 
will not prevent the constant possibility and necessity of wondering whether 
that negative discourse is not already prescribed by Hegel and comprehend-
ed by his discourse” (p. 124). 
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      The negative discourse is comprehended by Hegel but it is not named, 
nor given a structure. “This is a discourse that no simple negativity can es-
cape from, as it is precisely within it that the discursive status of negativity is 
decided. Nevertheless, Hegel’s discourse is in turn taken beyond its limits. 
The mediation of the Other slides toward the contract of speech,” toward the 
signifying chain in the science of the letter, through the intervention of the 
Freudian unconscious and Saussurean structural linguistics. Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe recognize the importance of Hegel in the thought of Lacan, 
and the importance of the philosophical foundations of psychoanalysis. The 
definition of the subject in discourse is based on the negative dialectic, and 
the concept of desire is based on the presence of absence in thought.  
      The structure of the relation between conscious and unconscious thought 
in psychoanalysis is an ontology as well as an epistemology, which has rami-
fications for the definition of the individual which are not present in Decon-
struction, which is primarily an epistemology. The ontological element in 
psychoanalysis is a result of the necessity of the subject as a science, as op-
posed to a philosophy, though it is the philosophy of psychoanalysis from 
which an ontology is formulated. The ontology is related in particular to the 
metaphysical negative theology of Plotinus (the role that the archê plays in 
the signifying chain, as well as the role of dianoetic knowledge in the science 
of the letter), which played such an important role in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, although, again, it has been displaced in the epistemological frame-
work. The negative theology is found in the primordial lack or hole in the 
system of language which is the black hole of signification, the void around 
which desire circulates, which makes signification both possible and impos-
sible. The hole is the void around which signification circulates, stimulating 
desire, as is the One of Neoplatonism, and it is defined by Lacan as both the 
objet a and the real. 
      The signifying chain of structural linguistics which is adopted into La-
canian psychoanalysis preserves the dialectic as well. The dialectic is be-
tween the signifier and the signified, or what would be redefined as the 
conceptual chain of signifiers. The network of the signifier is described by 
Lacan as the “synchronic structure of the language material in so far as in 
that structure each element assumes its precise function by being different 
from the others” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 126), while the network of the signi-
fied is the “diachronic set of the concretely pronounced discourses, which 
reacts historically on the first, just as the structure of the first governs the 
pathways of the second.” Significations only occur, as a result, “by constitut-
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ing their set by enveloping it in the signifier…” Language is thus “never sig-
nal, but always dialectical movement.”22 
      The dialectic preserves, to a certain extent, the dialectic of subjective and 
objective spirit in the Phenomenology of Spirit, between the universal and 
the particular. Language is defined by Lacan as a self-enclosed system whose 
holes or absences within reveal a connection to what is exterior to it, as in the 
dialectic of consciousness and self-consciousness in the thought of Hegel. 
Language for Lacan therefore “signifies in what it communicates: it is nei-
ther signal, nor sign, nor even sign of the thing insofar as the thing is an exte-
rior reality.”23 What is exterior to language is not revealed in the function of 
language, nor in conscious thought. “The relation between signifier and sig-
nified is entirely enclosed in the order of Language itself, which completely 
conditions its two terms” (The Language of the Self, p. 122, note 85), follow-
ing Saussure. Lacan compared language to mythology as a necessary and 
self-sufficient construct of understanding. 
      The dialectic of the synchronic and diachronic is present in the structural 
linguistics of Saussure, but in a different mode than in Lacan’s reformula-
tion, the influence of which has led to a certain amount of confusion about 
Saussure’s original concept. The dialectic occurs in Saussure’s distinction 
between language and speaking, la langue and parole. In Saussure’s concept, 
“synchronic linguistics will be concerned with the logical and psychological 
relations that bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collec-
tive mind of speakers,” or la langue, while “diachronic linguistics, on the 
contrary, will study relations that bind together successive terms not per-
ceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other without forming 
a system,” or parole (Course in General Linguistics, pp. 99–100). The signi-
fier and the signified, which are inseparable as the two sides of a piece of pa-
per, are both incorporated into the synchronic realm of la langue, while 
Lacan introduces the dialectic within la langue itself.  
      For Saussure, the structure of language is synchronic, manifest in univer-
sal (conceptual) laws, the objective of Hegel, while the diachronic occurs as 
a result of what is imposed upon language from without, manifest in particu-
lar events, retaining the Hegelian dialectic. “Diachronic facts are then partic-
ular; a shift in a system is brought about by events which not only are outside 
the system, but are isolated and form no system among themselves,” whereas 
“synchronic facts, no matter what they are, evidence a certain regularity but 
are in no way imperative; diachronic facts, on the contrary, force themselves 
upon language but are in no way general” (p. 95). Speech is then seen as the 
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conscious use (parole) of unconsciously determined structures (la langue), 
paralleling the relation between the sound-image and the concept of the sig-
nifier and the signified, with the addition of the diachronic element, and the 
relation between discursive reason and intellection. Diachronic linguistics or 
parole display the same divisions and classifications as discursive thought, 
while synchronic linguistics or la langue display the unity and totality of the 
intellectual, and a priori intuition. Lacan reinterprets the concept of the signi-
fied as containing the same diachronic element that is present in the parole of 
Saussure, thus reversing the expected relation between the signifier and 
speech and the signified and language, and the expected relation between 
speech and conscious discourse, and language and an unconscious structure. 
      The dialectic is also incorporated in a different way in the Lacanian 
structure of the relation between signifier and signified, in distinction from 
Saussure. La langue is determined by parole, as signified is determined by 
signifier, in that nothing can exist in la langue which cannot be manifest in 
parole, while it is also true that nothing exists in speech or writing as signifi-
er as other than concept, the network of signifiers as signified. Signification 
occurs only among signifiers, in the form of the algorithm. According to La-
can, “One thing is certain: if the algorithm S/s with its bar is appropriate, ac-
cess from one to the other cannot in any case have a signification. For in so 
far as it is itself only pure function of the signifier, the algorithm can reveal 
only the structure of a signifier in this transfer” (Écrits, A Selection, p. 152). 
Relations between signifiers consist of “reciprocal encroachments and in-
creasing inclusions” as differential elements in a closed system. The structure 
of the signifying chain is similar to “rings of a necklace that is a ring in an-
other necklace made of rings” (p. 153).  
      The relation between signifier and signified in the chain is always antici-
pated and inferred but never actualized, always deferred, as in différance. 
The result is the glissement of the signifier, as in metaphor and metonymy. 
The metonym produces signification in the linear combination of signifiers 
without crossing the bar to the signified; “it is the connection between signi-
fier and signifier that permits the elision in which the signifier installs the 
lack-of-being in the object relation,” the absence of the signified, “using the 
value of ‘reference back’ possessed by signification,” to the absent signified, 
“in order to invest it with the desire aimed at the very lack it supports” (p. 
164), thus the dialectic. The metaphor, meanwhile, in the substitution of sig-
nifier for signifier, in the actual elision of the first signified, crosses the bar 
between signifier and signified, and in that way causes signification. “This 
Jacques Lacan                                                                                                43 
 
crossing expresses the condition of passage of the signifier into the signi-
fied….” As Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe observed, the bar is both crossed 
and not crossed, because “the unconscious is the axis between the signifier 
and the signified,” according to Lacan (Écrits, p. 166). The unconscious only 
exists as absence in conscious discourse, thus preserving the Hegelian dialec-
tic between reason and the other, which only exists as an absence in reason.              
 
This essay developed and rewritten from sections of Architecture and Psychoanaly-
sis, New York: Peter Lang, 2006, without the references to architecture, and with 
revisions and corrections. 
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